

## THE RETURN OF ODYSSEUS: A HOMERIC THEOXENY<sup>1</sup>

Ἀναγνώρισις γὰρ διόλου, says Aristotle of the *Odyssey*,<sup>2</sup> and throughout the poem's second half, with which we are here concerned, there is indeed a series of progressive recognitions as Odysseus reveals himself to Telemachos, Eurykleia, Eumaios, the suitors, Penelope and finally Laertes. So the importance of the opposite is not surprising; without concealment and deception there could be no eventual recognition. Concealment is of course necessary if Odysseus is to survive in the face of so many enemies, as Athena tells him (13. 307–10). But in addition, in any work of imaginative literature, so long as the reader or audience is aware of the truth, concealment and unperceived identity open the door to all sorts of half-truths and ironies – possibilities most obviously explored in tragedy and later comedy, but also made use of in the *Odyssey*. The irony which may be inherent in the arrival of the 'nameless stranger' has been most thoroughly explored by Fenik;<sup>3</sup> here we examine a further implication.

Once Odysseus lands in Ithaca, the dramatic elements of the situation have changed vastly; he is now, as he was not on Phaeacia or Calypso's island, among people who have known him well – but who will not recognize him. To preserve his secret, he has a set of variations on a false identity as a Cretan, which he deploys successfully when necessary;<sup>4</sup> we come to expect the story to be brought out and elaborated. But the first introduction of this motif, far from establishing it in its basic form, is of all versions the furthest from the norm. Alone on the shore of his native land, which he fails to recognize, Odysseus meets Athena in the guise of a shepherd boy. Having learnt where he is and having been obliquely questioned by her as to his identity, he replies with the first version of his Cretan story. Athena of course is not deceived, but pleased with the cunning shown by her favourite:

ἐπεὶ σὺ μὲν ἔσσι βροτῶν ὅχ' ἄριστος ἀπάντων  
βουλῇ καὶ μύθοισιν, ἐγὼ δ' ἐν πᾶσι θεοῖσι  
μήτι τε κλέομαι καὶ κέρδεσιν (13. 297–9)

and the two together go on to discuss means of disposing of the suitors. The irony of this scene is inescapable.<sup>5</sup> Odysseus in the end does not know the very Ithaca for which he has longed – just as later its people will not know him, for whom they are waiting. Neither does he know – perhaps more reasonably, for he rightly says ἀργαλέον σε, θεά, γνῶναι βροτῷ ἀντιάσαντι (312) – his particular patron among the gods; he is wary and suspicious, and tries to deceive her. But the deceiver is out-deceived; on this first occasion – and only here – the false tale will not work. The scene reveals Odysseus as the same prudent and wily hero as he was in his wanderings, checking that his possessions have not been stolen by the Phaeacian escort and through a reasonable caution restraining his joy on hearing that he is in his native land. One can view the episode as a test, a trial of Odysseus' most conspicuous quality, which he passes with flying colours. But the non-recognition emphasizes his powerlessness;

<sup>1</sup> I am grateful to Dr N. J. Richardson for his comments on reading a first draft of this paper.

<sup>2</sup> *Poetics* 1459B.

<sup>3</sup> B. Fenik, *Studies in the Odyssey*, *Hermes Einzelschriften* 30 (Wiesbaden, 1974) especially pp. 5–61.

<sup>4</sup> As well as 13. 256 ff., at 14. 192 ff., 17. 419 ff., 19. 165 ff.

<sup>5</sup> See H. Kleinknecht, *Gymnasium* 65 (1958), 59 ff.

he feels himself to be alone, for he has not seen the goddess face to face since leaving Troy (316–19),<sup>6</sup> and even the most cunning of mortals cannot prevail against a divine disguise. But this first appearance of Athena in ten years is to serve as prologue to her many interventions up to the end of the poem. No longer will Odysseus feel himself without divine assistance; by the time of the slaughter of the suitors, he can, on seeing Mentor, be heartened by the suspicion that it is really Athena who is present (22. 210).

Athena's next appearance takes place at Eumaios' hut in book 16, a scene in many ways parallel to, and strongly contrasted with, the earlier episode on the seashore. The poet has taken great pains with this first and, as I hope to show, thematically most significant of the recognition scenes. The structure of the first half of the book, leading up to the recognition of Odysseus by Telemachos, is unusually closely woven and full of significant details. The episode begins at Telemachos' arrival with a slight recapitulation of the situation of book 13, with Odysseus again in the position of ignorance; for if the son cannot recognize his father, neither will the father know his son. The possibilities here are not thoroughly exploited, however, since Eumaios immediately greets Telemachos by name. Odysseus has in fact already recognized that it is no ordinary stranger who is arriving, for the dogs from which he has himself nearly suffered (14. 29 ff.) greet Telemachos as a friend. To them, Odysseus is a stranger on his own estate, while they are familiar with Telemachos. In other respects the positions of father and son are markedly similar; both have been away from home facing great dangers, and their friends have not expected to see them again (23–4). The simile describing Eumaios' greeting of Telemachos – one of those Homeric similes which do clearly have more than one point of comparison – exploits the resemblance:

ὥς δὲ πατὴρ ὃν παῖδα φίλα φρονέων ἀγαπάζη,  
ἐλθόντ' ἐξ ἀπίης γαίης δεκάτῳ ἐνιαυτῷ,  
μοῦνον τηλύγετον, τῷ ἔπ' ἄλγεα πολλὰ μογήσῃ. . . (16. 17–19)

The son here is like Telemachos, but also, perhaps even more, like Odysseus.<sup>7</sup>

The circumstances of Odysseus and Telemachos have points both of resemblance and divergence. The differences are due to the knowledge or lack of it possessed by the actors in this scene. Telemachos, in Odysseus' presumed absence, is acknowledged as the master; the dogs recognize him as such, and so does Eumaios.<sup>8</sup> On the other hand – and this is where the scene-contrast comes in – Odysseus is now in full possession of knowledge, and therefore already in control of events when Athena appears, in a way in which he was not in book 13. In his indignant speech to Telemachos, wishing that the suitors might be punished (91–111), he is hardly even bothering to pretend; he has almost declared himself, hiding only behind conditional clauses. The pace of events leading to the recognition is stepped up, and the irony becomes more marked – for Telemachos, in accordance with the conventions of this type of scene, shows no reaction to this aspect of Odysseus' words. So far the scene has borne only a rather vague, situational resemblance to the scene on the seashore. They have been parallel situations in that a character (Odysseus, Telemachos) has been unknowingly in the presence of someone important (Athena, Odysseus) whom he takes to be a person of no significance. There has also been an element of testing; Odysseus, while unaware

<sup>6</sup> Lines 322–3 seem to imply that Odysseus was aware that it was Athena who guided him to the Phaeacian city, which was not the case in book 7; they fit rather ill here, and indeed Aristarchus rejected lines 320–3.

<sup>7</sup> On this interesting simile see C. Moulton, *Similes in the Homeric Poems, Hypomnemata* 49 (Göttingen, 1977), 132–3.

<sup>8</sup> γλυκερὸν φάος (23) implies that Telemachos represents hope and potential σωτηρία, as from a rightful master; cf. Aesch. *Pers.* 169 for the connection.

of Athena's identity, has shown himself to excel in those qualities which she most values, while Telemachos has exhibited, again unknowingly, qualities which a father would look for in his son: his first words show his unhappy concern for the situation in his home; he refuses to let the apparently aged and ignoble Odysseus give up his seat for him (again the irony – father standing up for son!) and expresses his regret that he cannot entertain him properly in the palace. Then, after Eumaios has been removed, the sudden appearance of Athena highlights the similarity with book 13. Again we notice Odysseus' superiority to his son in knowledge and perception: Telemachos is unaware of the goddess's arrival, οὐ γάρ πως πάντεσσι θεοὶ φαίνονται ἐναργεῖς (161). Athena's change of Odysseus' appearance parallels the same event in 13. But now we find the parallelism working in the same way as in the 'testing' episode: Odysseus, in full possession of knowledge, takes the part of Athena on the seashore, with the baffled Telemachos in the role of Odysseus. But the change in Odysseus' appearance (which is now equivalent not to the earlier change in him effected by Athena, but to Athena's own change from shepherd boy into beautiful woman) does not – of course – make Telemachos recognize him. He recognizes the divine power at work, but draws the wrong conclusions and supposes that Odysseus is a god.

The central portion of the episode cuts through the accumulated irony at a stroke, discarding it in favour of simplicity. The ἀναγνώρισις itself is the emotional high point of the book and one of the most moving scenes of the *Odyssey*. When his son addresses him as a god, Odysseus replies in simple, abrupt and emphatic language:

οὐ τίς τοι θεός εἰμι· τί μ' ἀθανάτοισιν εἴσκεῖς;  
ἀλλὰ πατὴρ τεός εἰμι, τοῦ εἵνεκα σὺ στεναχίζων  
πάσχεις ἄλγεα πολλά, βίας ὑποδέγμενος ἀνδρῶν. (16. 187–9)

The three lines expound the situation in language which is simple and direct, yet emotionally charged.<sup>9</sup> (As Stanford remarks, the repetition θεός εἰμι . . . τεός εἰμι in the same position in the line is intended to be solemn and emphatic.) In a manner with which we are familiar from, say, *Oedipus Tyrannus*, the elaborate structure of ironies, half-truths and almost-revelations has been shattered by a few simple words. τὰ πάντ' ἄν ἐξήκοι σαφῆ – or so it must seem to Odysseus:

ὥς ἄρα φωνήσας νιδὼν κύσε, καὶ δὲ παρειῶν  
δάκρυον ἤκε χαμαῖζε· πάρος δ' ἔχε νωλεμές αἰεῖ. (16. 190–1)

Caution and guile have given way to emotion, and the effect is both pathetic and realistic. There is an answering touch of realism in Telemachos' natural refusal to believe the stranger, and in Odysseus' gentle explanation of the truth to his son. The scene is a masterpiece of character-drawing, and it is surprising that it has not been more appreciated. Scholars have generally confined their attention to pointing out that this recognition scene cannot proceed along the lines of those which follow, since father and son do not know each other and have no shared σῆμα; this is true, of course, but we can go further than this negative approach. Müller indeed sees that the miraculous transformation is itself the σῆμα;<sup>10</sup> once Telemachos has rejected the hypothesis of a god in disguise, or vaguer, a divine trick, there is no other conclusion but that the stranger's words are true and that this is his father, backed up by divine aid. But this is not, I think, the only function of Telemachos' mistake. In the parallel scene on the seashore, the being who changed in appearance really was a god and, the recognition accomplished, she proceeded as the superior party to give counsel to

<sup>9</sup> Cf. on this type of statement Jasper Griffin, *Homer on Life and Death* (Oxford, 1980), p. 121.

<sup>10</sup> Marion Müller, *Athene als göttliche Helferin in der Odyssee* (Heidelberg, 1966), pp. 109–10.

Odysseus and discuss her plans of joint success for their project. Exactly the same happens here, on a more elaborate scale. After Odysseus has given a short explanation of his coming, he goes on to instruct Telemachos in the plan to overcome the suitors, now taking the role which was Athena's in book 13. In other words, Odysseus has now taken on a divine part himself. By this I do not mean to imply that he has become equated with a god, merely that (with Athena's blessing) he is now acting out what was previously her part. It is perhaps partly for this reason that it is the first of the false tales which fails to work: at that stage Odysseus is still helpless in front of Athena; afterwards, when they are successful, he is in quite a different position.

At this point we can, I think, see some extra meaning in Telemachos' hailing the transformed Odysseus as a god. It is one further irony preceding the final recognition. Telemachos' wrong guess is right not only inasmuch as the change is due to divine power, but also in that Odysseus somehow *stands for* a god. His words are revealing:

ἡ μάλα τις θεός ἐσσι, τοὶ οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἔχουσιν·  
ἀλλ' ἔληθ', ἵνα τοι κεχαρισμένα δώσωμεν ἱρά  
ἡδὲ χρύσέα δῶρα τετυγμένα· φείδεο δ' ἡμέων. (16. 183–5)

The reaction is one of fear, but fear of what? Telemachos has already had encounters with Athena in human disguise, when she revealed her true nature only by her sudden disappearance. Those visits were a sign of exceptional favour, as Nestor pointed out (3. 375–6); but there is no reason for Telemachos to suppose that this visitation is in any way connected. In fact, fear is a natural reaction to a divine epiphany,<sup>11</sup> but behind the plea *φείδεο δ' ἡμέων* lies, I think, something more specific. Why should a god appear in mortal disguise in a poor hut and then reveal himself? We know that in the world of the *Odyssey* the gods do associate from time to time with mortals on apparently equal terms, from Athena's appearances in the Telemacheia, and also from the Phaeacians' statement that the gods had appeared to them *ἐναργεῖς* at their sacrifices and eaten with them (7. 201–3).<sup>12</sup> Mortals may be singled out by the gods to give them hospitality, a circumstance which outside epic often leads to the foundation of new cults and ritual. In real life, the theoxeny is closely connected with cult. But in literature it has another function:

καί τε θεοὶ ξείνοισιν οἰκότες ἀλλοδαποῖσι,  
παντοίοι τελέθοντες, ἐπιστρωφῶσι πόληας  
ἀνθρώπων ὕβριν τε καὶ εὐνομίην ἐφορῶντες. (17. 485–7)

This is what Telemachos was afraid of. The stranger was all the while deceiving him in order to test him. (We have seen that in reality there was some element of Telemachos' passing a test.) He has been unable to offer the stranger hospitality at the palace, and mere good intentions may not suffice for a god. So in Ovid, after Jupiter and Mercury have given a sign of their divinity:

attoniti nouitate paent manibusque supinis  
concupiunt Baucisque preces timidusque Philemon  
et ueniam dapibus nullisque paratibus orant. (*Met.* 8. 681–3)

<sup>11</sup> Even when there is no specific reason for fear, men are often afraid at the appearance of a god: see Griffin, *op. cit.* pp. 153–4. Some further examples are collected in N. J. Richardson, *The Homeric Hymn to Demeter* (Oxford, 1974), p. 208.

<sup>12</sup> The Phaeacians were especially privileged, and the gods did not assume any disguise when associating with them. Alkinoos suggests, however, that Odysseus may be a god in disguise (a new device of the gods, then); but the suggestion finds no echo in the actual circumstance, as it does later.

It is in fact the Philemon and Baucis story – which is obviously much older than Ovid<sup>13</sup> – which, at least in its earlier half, provides the most explicit scheme of the story, and the parallel of that version with the supposed divine epiphany in the swineherd's hut is obvious. 'Haec...limina victor|Alcides subiit, haec illum regia cepit', Verg. *Aen.* 8. 362–3. The host at a theoxeny is often – not always – poor, because 'poor but honest' and 'rich and powerful but unjust' are categories which belong very well in the moral scheme represented by this type of story, as we shall see.

What then are the characteristics of this type of theoxeny? We must first set aside the simple aetiological type where the myth says only that a hero entertained a god and became his first priest: Oineus, Phytalos and Diomos provide examples of this, and of course in historical times Sophocles–Dexion.<sup>14</sup> Here no moral element is involved, beyond the underlying assumption that the hero must be pious and upright. But some of these foundation-legends also contain the elements of testing; the Homeric Hymn to Demeter relates the foundation of the Mysteries, but it also tells of Metaneira's failure of a test, through her lack of trust in the stranger: the 'test' aspect is brought into relief by the goddess's immediately following self-revelation.<sup>15</sup> The classic story of Philemon and Baucis too, where the aged couple are the only two to survive the basic test of hospitality, ends in the establishment of a temple. The cult-legend has been much elaborated and further moralized; the scheme is often extended to the failure of the mortal to offer hospitality and his consequent punishment. But it is not necessary (as in the *Odyssey* quotation and the Philemon and Baucis story) that the gods be engaged on an 'inspection tour', as Fontenrose puts it, with an expressly moral purpose, to discover the *ὑβρις* and *εὐνομία* of men. The wanderings of Demeter and Dionysos had no such purpose, but both gods punished in measure those they found unjust and rewarded the righteous.<sup>16</sup> The factor which above all creates the story is the hidden identity of the god, who may even appear in the humblest of human guises (an old woman in the cases of Demeter and Hera).<sup>17</sup> This hidden identity is of course a prerequisite for the test consciously imposed, and explains how the suitors, in the heavily ironic<sup>18</sup> passage from book 17 quoted above, can contemplate the possibility that Odysseus might be a god. Also implicit in the situation is the irony of the apparent inferior – who could be spurned without fear of reprisals – being in fact a superior, able to exact punishment and bestow rewards according to absolute justice. A good act performed without thought of benefit is

<sup>13</sup> See A. S. Hollis, *Ovid: Metamorphoses VIII* (Oxford, 1970), pp. 106–12; F. Bömer, *Ovid: Metamorphosen* (Heidelberg, 1977), iv. 190 ff.; L. Malten, *Hermes* 74 (1939), 176 ff.; J. Fontenrose, *University of California Publications in Classical Antiquity* 13 (1945), 93 ff.

<sup>14</sup> Oineus: Apollod. 1. 8. 1, Hyg. *Fab.* 129. Phytalos: Paus. 1. 34. 2. Diomos: Steph. Byz. s.v. *Διόμεια*. Dexion: Istros *FGH Hist* 334 F 38, *Etym. Mag.* s.v. *Δεξιῶν*. The teaching of a skill in these stories is equivalent to, and usually implies, the institution of a cult and priesthood. See F. Deneken, *De theoxeniis* (Diss. Berlin, 1881). A. P. Burnett, 'Pentheus and Dionysos: Host and Guest' *CPh* 65 (1970), 24–5 n. 8, supplies a comprehensive list of gods entertained by mortals.

<sup>15</sup> The failure is an interesting feature complicating the general success-story, resulting of course in Demophon's being deprived of immortality. The family's success in the basic hospitality was rewarded by the institution of the Eleusinian rites, in which the 'daughters of Keleos' played some part (Paus. 1. 38. 3). Another Attic version (Ant. Lib. 24) relates a more spectacular failure: the boy Askalabos mocked Demeter for her eager draining of the bowl of *κυκεῶν*, and was turned by her into a lizard. Cf. Burnett, art. cit. p. 25 n. 9.

<sup>16</sup> For instance, Paus. 2. 35. 4, Diod. 4. 2. 6, 3. 4.

<sup>17</sup> Hera: in Ap. Rhod. 3. 66 ff. – not strictly a theoxeny but fulfilling the same purpose in the moral aspect. Cf. Richardson, op. cit. p. 182.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Annie F. Dekker, *Ironie in de Odyssee* (Leiden, 1965), p. 211; B. Fenik, op. cit. p. 224.

rewarded, an evil act which the doer supposed he could commit with impunity is punished. This type of divine visitation is then one answer to the ultimate problem posed by all systems which envisage τὸ θεῖον as the guardian of morality – how is it that so often the evil apparently flourish and the good suffer?

Odysseus is not, of course, a god; neither is his purpose in arriving at the hut to make trial of Telemachos. The hint given by Telemachos' mistake looks forward to the whole subsequent development of the plot. At the palace Odysseus will be received – after a fashion! – as a guest. He will test the servants (305–7) not only as a precaution, but surely (looking forward to the actual events of book 22) with avenging justice in mind. While appearing to be of no account – πτωχῶ λευγαλέῳ ἐναλίγκιον ἢ δὲ γέροντι (273) – he will *in fact* be the suitors' superior, supreme ruler of Ithaca and master of the house where they entertain themselves; favoured by the gods, as an accelerating series of divine appearances and omens makes clear, and eventually not only the hero triumphant over his enemies, but also the instrument of divine justice. As Jupiter and Mercury give a sign of their true nature in the miraculously replenished wine-jug, Odysseus' stringing of the bow and accomplishment of the test of skill similarly provide a sign, for those who would understand it, of his true identity, and form the immediate prelude to his self-revelation.<sup>19</sup> When therefore some of the suitors suggest that the beggar may be a god in disguise, they are not so very far from the truth, for Odysseus will perform exactly the same function as a god.

To sum up: looking back to the earlier scenes on Ithaca, we can see that through the use of motifs of deception, concealment and consequent irony – dependent on our knowledge of the truth – they look forward to the fundamental datum of the palace scene, Odysseus' concealed identity and power, and its similarity to the folk-tale, 'moral' version of the theoxeny. In book 13 Odysseus, though his native character does not desert him, is still, by virtue of the plot, in the almost helpless position which others later occupy in relation to him, lacking essential knowledge. It is necessary for Athena to instruct Odysseus in her plan, and it is only after this divine sanction, as it were, that he can take on his own godlike role. The similar features in book 16 point out the contrast, and the ironic device of a mistaken identification looks forward to the effect Odysseus' arrival will have on the palace and its inhabitants.

The dénouement of the *Odyssey* is in full accordance with the concept of divine justice expressed and implicit in the poem. It should not be necessary to demonstrate in detail that the slaughter of the suitors is, at least in part, a moral act.<sup>20</sup> Odysseus, though the demands of the heroic insist that he be in book 22 fully the warrior engaged in his ἀριστεία, is also in another sense the instrument of divine justice. τοῦσδε δὲ μοῖρ' ἐδάμασσε θεῶν καὶ σχέτλια ἔργα, he says himself (413). Like the god in a theoxeny he punishes transgressors and sets to rights a moral order which has gone wrong. This effect is subtly emphasized by the curious portrayal of Athena in the μνηστηροφονία. This is her vengeance, as well as Odysseus': the first plots were of her devising, and we are explicitly told that the end is brought about by both of them, θεὰ καὶ καρτερὸς ἀνὴρ (20. 393: significantly, as a punishment, πρότεροι γὰρ αἰεκέα

<sup>19</sup> An earlier and less certain sign is given by the defeat of Iros in book 18; it is significant that this sign is followed by the warning speech of Odysseus to Amphinomos (18. 125 ff.). The leisurely pace of the palace narrative – too leisurely for some tastes – allows such elaborations on the basic theme.

<sup>20</sup> See for instance 20. 393–4, 22. 39–40, and 23. 63–7 (what ought to happen). In the light of these and other explicit statements, I do not understand how Adkins can say 'Though right triumphs in the main plot of... the *Odyssey*, it does not do so *because* it is right' (*Merit and Responsibility*, p. 62). The all-pervasive 'moral' view of the *Odyssey* is expounded e.g. by Lloyd-Jones, *Justice of Zeus*, pp. 28 ff., as now by Griffin, *op. cit.* pp. 164–5.

μηχανόωντο). But in the actual slaughter, her overt action is slight, for her deflexion of arrows and spears (22. 256 and 273: τὰ δὲ πάντα (πολλὰ) ἑτώσια θῆκεν Ἀθήνη) belongs strictly to the 'unemphatic' type of divine intervention, and when disguised as Mentor her main function is that of verbal encouragement (224–35). She is present, but not, as it were, in the front line of fighting; she does not act in her Phaeacian manner, improving on Odysseus' quoit-throwing. Of course, to do justice to the 'heroic' aspect of the vengeance, we do not want such crude intervention at this stage; Odysseus must win by his own efforts. But there are signs that this is her victory too. Her appearance holding out the aegis from the roof is a tableau paralleling that of Odysseus poised on the threshold at the beginning of the book, so admired by Plato (*Ion* 535B). θεὰ καὶ καρτερὸς ἀνὴρ indeed, but each operating on a separate plane. Athena's part in the vengeance is made much more subtle and less explicit than many of her earlier interventions, and this paradoxically increases our impression of divine justice behind the act. No longer, in this scene, is Athena simply a divine protector who for personal reasons has taken a liking to Odysseus: she is almost the personification of the will of the gods.<sup>21</sup> Levy, in an interesting speculation on the story,<sup>22</sup> supposes that in the original folk-tale of the guests who outstay their welcome the transgressors would actually be struck down by gods. Clearly this version would be less satisfactory from the point of view of Odysseus' heroic prowess, but if this is the original, Homer has not altered the fact that behind Odysseus is the whole apparatus of divine justice, which demands the suitors' death, and he has shown clearly that Odysseus' role is in a sense that of a god.

The moral climate of the poem is precisely that of the theoxeny story. This type of story is the dream of the man who considers himself upright yet hard done by. A miraculous intervention would set right his circumstances and reveal his exceptional virtue, while his oppressors would be punished. This is precisely what Odysseus' intervention achieves, though *in fact* motivated by considerations of personal interest and honour. The suitors are punished, the outraged Penelope, Telemachos and the various loyal servants are saved from further indignities and rewarded by the master's return. Justice, beyond hope, has triumphed, and religious morality has been vindicated. Zeus' programmatic statement (1. 32 ff.), that mortals bring their downfall upon themselves by their foolish and wicked deeds, is finally borne out by the godlike action of Odysseus.

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<sup>21</sup> It is very significant that the divine enemy Poseidon is not mentioned after book 13, except in the context of the sacrifice ordered by Teiresias. The gods now seem to present a united front favouring Odysseus, and the divine will is made clear by omens and portents.

<sup>22</sup> *TAPA* 94 (1963), pp. 145–56.